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7 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
8 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
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10 KERRY ROBERTS,

11 Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11cv2665-WQH-BLM

12 vs.
13 DOMINGO URIBE,
14 Respondent.

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the review of the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 18) issued by United States Magistrate Judge Barbara Lynn Major, recommending that this Court deny the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) filed by Respondent Domingo Uribe.

18 **BACKGROUND**

19 On November 21, 2008, a jury in San Diego County Superior Court found Petitioner
20 guilty of five counts of robbery and one count of burglary. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2; Lodgment 4 at
21 1). Petitioner admitted one prior strike and two prior prison terms. (Lodgment 4 at 1). The
22 state court sentenced Petitioner to a determinate prison term of twenty-one years and four
23 months. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2; Lodgment 4 at 1).

24 On May 17, 2010, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial
25 court in an unpublished opinion. (Lodgment 4). On July 21, 2010, the California Supreme
26 Court denied Petitioner's petition for review without comment. (Lodgment 6).

27 On March 29, 2011, the San Diego County Superior Court denied Petitioner's petition
28 for writ of habeas corpus. (Lodgment 10). On July 19, 2011, the California Court of Appeal

1 denied Petitioner's habeas petition. (Lodgment 12). On February 1, 2012, the California
 2 Supreme Court denied Petitioner's habeas petition. (Lodgment 14).

3 On November 14, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
 4 ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner alleges his
 5 federal constitutional rights were violated on seven grounds: (1) the state trial court erred in
 6 denying Petitioner's *Marsden* motion; (2) the state trial court erred in denying Petitioner's
 7 *Farettta* rights; (3) Petitioner's state trial counsel had a conflict of interest; (4) Petitioner and
 8 his state trial counsel had irreconcilable differences; (5) Petitioner's state trial counsel was
 9 ineffective; (6) the state trial court denied Petitioner's motion to exclude evidence of
 10 identifications, based on an allegedly unduly suggestive photo lineup, in violation of
 11 Petitioner's due process rights; and (7) the trial court gave jury instructions on flight as
 12 evidence of guilt when the identity of the perpetrators was at issue, thereby depriving
 13 Petitioner of his right to a fair trial. *Id.* at 6-25.

14 On January 17, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition on the grounds
 15 that the Petition contained unexhausted and procedurally defaulted claims (ECF No. 6), which
 16 the Court denied without prejudice on May 24, 2012. (ECF No. 9).

17 On August 7, 2012, Respondent filed the Motion to Dismiss currently pending before
 18 the Court. (ECF No. 11). Respondent contends that the Petition should be dismissed on the
 19 grounds that it contains both procedurally defaulted and unexhausted claims.

20 The docket reflects that Petitioner did not file an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.

21 On February 6, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued the Report and Recommendation,
 22 recommending that the Motion to Dismiss be denied. (ECF No. 18 at 2, 15). The Report and
 23 Recommendation states:

24 [T]his Court finds that the petition contains two unexhausted claims (Claims 5
 25 and 7) and five exhausted claims (1-4 and 6). Because the petition contains both
 26 exhausted and unexhausted claims, this Court is required to dismiss the petition.
 27 However, in lieu of immediate dismissal, this Court RECOMMENDS that
 Petitioner be sent an options order specifying Petitioner's options with regard
 to the mixed petition. If Petitioner does not elect one of the identified options,
 then this Court RECOMMENDS that the petition be DENIED.

28 *Id.* at 15.

1 The Report and Recommendation concludes: “[N]o later than February 27, 2013, any
 2 party to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties....
 3 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the
 4 right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order.” (ECF No. 18 at 16 (citation
 5 omitted)).

6 The docket reflects that neither party filed objections to the Report and
 7 Recommendation.

8 **REVIEW OF THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

9 The duties of the district court in connection with a report and recommendation of a
 10 magistrate judge are set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. §
 11 636(b)(1). When a party objects to a report and recommendation, “[a] judge of the [district]
 12 court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation]
 13 to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When no objections are filed, the district
 14 court need not review the report and recommendation de novo. *See United States v.*
 15 *Reyna-Tapia*, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). A district court may “accept,
 16 reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
 17 judge.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

18 Neither party objected to the Report and Recommendation, and the Court has reviewed
 19 the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. The Court finds that the Respondent has failed
 20 to demonstrate that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, and concludes that the
 21 Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied. The Court
 22 finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he has exhausted claims five and seven of
 23 the Petition in the state courts. As it appears the Petition contains both unexhausted and
 24 exhausted claims, the Magistrate Judge correctly recommended that the Court inform
 25 Petitioner of his options going forward. The Court adopts the Report and Recommendation
 26 in its entirety.

27 **PETITIONER’S OPTIONS**

28 To avoid the Court dismissing the Petition on its own accord, Petitioner may choose one

1 of the following options.

2 **I. First Option: Demonstrate Exhaustion**

3 Petitioner may file further papers with this Court to demonstrate that he has in fact
4 exhausted the claims the Court has determined are likely unexhausted.

5 **II. Second Option: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition**

6 Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal Petition and return to state
7 court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal petition
8 containing only exhausted claims. *See Rose v. Lundy*, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 520-21 (1982)
9 (stating that a petitioner who files a mixed petition may dismiss his petition to “return[] to state
10 court to exhaust his claims”).

11 Petitioner is cautioned that any new federal petition must be filed before expiration of
12 the one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, a petitioner has one year from when his
13 conviction became final to file his federal petition, unless he can show that statutory or
14 equitable “tolling” applies. *Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001); 28 U.S.C. §
15 2244(d).¹ The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus
16 petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); *see also Nino v. Galaza*, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th
17 Cir. 1999); *but see also Artuz v. Bennett*, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application is
18 ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for

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20 ¹28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) provides:
21 (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
22 habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of--
23 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
24 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by
State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
25 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review;
or
26 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
27 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgement or claim is
pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this
28 subsection.

placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.”); *Bonner v. Carey*, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a state application for post-conviction relief which is ultimately dismissed as untimely was neither “properly filed” nor “pending” while it was under consideration by the state court, and therefore does not toll the statute of limitations), *as amended* 439 F.3d 993. However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations continues to run while a federal habeas petition is pending. *Duncan*, 533 U.S. at 181-82.

III. Third Option: Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claims

Petitioner may formally abandon his unexhausted claims and proceed with his exhausted ones. *See Rose*, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21 (stating that a petitioner who files a mixed petition may “resubmit[] the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims”). Petitioner is cautioned that once he abandons his unexhausted claims, he may lose the ability to ever raise them in federal court. *See Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 488 (2000) (stating that a court’s ruling on the merits of claims presented in a first § 2254 petition renders any later petition successive); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(b).²

IV. Fourth Option: File a Motion to Stay the Federal Proceedings

Petitioner may file a motion to stay this federal proceeding while he returns to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claim(s). There are two methods available to Petitioner, the “stay and abeyance” procedure and the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure.

If Petitioner wishes to use the “stay and abeyance” procedure he should ask the Court to stay his mixed Petition while he returns to state court to exhaust. Under this procedure he must demonstrate there are arguably meritorious claim(s) which he wishes to return to state

²28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides that a claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under § 2254 shall be dismissed unless:

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
 (B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
 (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

1 court to exhaust, that he is diligently pursuing his state court remedies with respect to those
2 claim(s), and that good cause exists for his failure to timely exhaust his state court remedies.
3 *Rhines v. Webber*, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005).

4 If Petitioner wishes to use the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure, he must
5 voluntarily withdraw his unexhausted claim(s), ask the Court to stay the proceedings and hold
6 the fully-exhausted Petition in abeyance while he returns to state court to exhaust, and then
7 seek permission to amend his Petition to include the newly exhausted claim(s) after exhaustion
8 is complete. *King v. Ryan*, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). Although under this procedure
9 Petitioner is not required to demonstrate good cause for his failure to timely exhaust, the newly
10 exhausted claim(s) must be either timely under the statute of limitations or “relate back” to the
11 claim(s) in the fully-exhausted Petition; that is, they must share a “common core of operative
12 facts” with the previously exhausted claim(s). *King*, 564 F.3d at 1143 (quoting *Mayle v. Felix*,
13 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005)).

14 **CONCLUSION**

15 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 18) is
16 ADOPTED in its entirety. The Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is DENIED.

17 The Court notifies Petitioner that the Petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted
18 claims and is therefore subject to dismissal. No later than thirty (30) days of the date of this
19 Order, Petitioner shall file a pleading with the Court pursuant to one of the options described
20 above. Respondent shall file any reply within forty-five (45) days of the date of this Order.
21 If Petitioner fails to respond to this Order within thirty (30) days, the Court will dismiss the
22 Petition without prejudice.³ See *Rose*, 455 U.S. at 522.
DATED: March 11, 2013

23 
24 **WILLIAM Q. HAYES**
25 United States District Judge
26
27

28 ³Although the dismissal is “without prejudice,” Petitioner is again cautioned that any
later federal petition may be barred by the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2); see also footnote one of this Order.